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MINING FOR EMBEDDED DATA: IS IT ETHICAL TO TAKE
INTENTIONAL ADVANTAGE OF OTHER PEOPLE'S FAILURES?
David Hricik'
Embedded data is information, including metadata, that
accompanies many common word processing files, but which is
ordinarily not seen on the screen. Unless a lawyer removes
embedded data from a file before sending the file to opposing
counsel, the embedded data accompanying the file could reveal
confidential or privileged information. The authorities disagree on
whether the transmission of embedded data is either "inadvertent"
or "dishonest" in terms of the disciplinary rules. This Article
contends that transmission of embedded data should be at least
presumptively inadvertent and that it is dishonest for a lawyer to
actively look for embedded data.
I. THE INEVITABILITY OF INADVERTENT TRANSMISSION
Lawyers transmit both paper and electronic documents to
opposing counsel and third parties every day. Obviously, lawyers
have an obligation to take reasonable care to not disclose
information to an opposing or third party that is privileged,
confidential, or subject to work-product protection.2 Inadvertent
disclosure of confidential information can harm the client by
waiving any claim to the protected status of the information or by
1 Associate Professor of Law, Mercer University School of Law, Macon,
Georgia. The title is inspired by John Wesley Harding's song "Other People's
Failure" from the compact disc John Wesley Harding's New Deal (Rhino 1996).
I would like to thank the editors of North Carolina Journal of Law &
Technology for inviting me to participate in their symposium and for their
hospitality during the event, and to Wesley Stace for being such a good sport
about the song titles.
2 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 17 (2003) ("When
transmitting a communication that includes information relating to the
representation of a client, the lawyer must take reasonable precautions to prevent
the information from coming into the hands of unintended recipients.").
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simply letting the cat out of the bag, harming the client regardless
of whether the information is admissible at trial.'
However, despite the exercise of reasonable care, lawyers have
continued and will continue to inadvertently transmit confidential
information' to an opposing or third party. Either they will fail to
take appropriate technological safeguards,' or those safeguards will
fail despite the lawyer's best efforts. Accidents will happen.6
That is why many lawyers have found themselves in the
position of having to determine how to respond when they
inadvertently received a document from opposing counsel.' Since
perfection is unattainable, lawyers will continue to be put in this
position notwithstanding the rise of technological "cures" to
inadvertent transmission of embedded data.'
See In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d 976 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (holding that
inadvertently disclosing privileged information waives the privilege);
Georgetown Manor v. Ethan Allen Corp., 753 F. Supp. 936 (S.D. Fla. 1991)
(holding that inadvertent disclosure can never waive privilege); Alldread v. City
of Grenada, 988 F.2d 1425 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that inadvertent disclosure
can sometimes waive privilege).
4 For simplicity, this Article refers to information that is protected against
disclosure by rules governing confidentiality, work product, or other privilege
law as "confidential information." It should be noted, however, that there are
important differences not implicated by the discussion here that arise out of the
status of the information. For instance, it may be that confidentiality is lost by
inadvertent transmission, but the ability to object to the admissibility of the
information at trial remains intact. See, e.g., Purcell v. Dist. Att'y for Suffolk
Dist., 676 N.E.2d 436 (Mass. 1997) (holding that certain information was no
longer confidential, but was still privileged and so inadmissible at trial).
5 Although there are a growing number of software fixes to the problems
created by embedded data, nothing is foolproof. See generally ABA Comm. on
Ethics and Prof I Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-442 (2006) [hereinafter
Op. 06-442].
6 See, e.g., Jones v. Eagle-North Hills Shopping Centre, L.P., No. 06-CIV-
161-RAW, 2007 WL 184712 (E.D. Okla. 2007) (e-mail inadvertently sent by
plaintiffs counsel to defense lawyer).
7 See generally Andrew M. Perlman, Untangling Ethics Theory from Attorney
Conduct Rules: The Case of Inadvertent Disclosures, 13 GEO. MASON L. REV.
767 (2006) (collecting and thoroughly discussing the issues concerning
inadvertent transmission of confidential information).
8 See, e.g., Op. 06-442, supra note 5 (discussing various software "fixes").
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Because of recent advancements in communication technology,
more documents are exchanged today than ever before. This
recent proliferation of both electronic communications and
electronic documents has dramatically increased the frequency
with which mistakes can happen.' Consequently, it is easier to
make a mistake.o Now it only takes the click of a mouse-an
accidental "reply to all," for example-to inadvertently transmit a
privileged electronic file."
In addition, unlike the paper they replace, electronic files that
appear proper to send to opposing or third parties can contain
"hidden" information that can, nonetheless, be confidential.12 A
file created in Microsoft Word, for example, when viewed on a
screen by defense counsel, may simply show a plaintiffs
settlement offer. However, this file might contain "hidden"
comments between plaintiffs lawyer and client that reveal direct
or inferential information about their settlement strategies or
"bottom lines."" Unless specific steps are taken to reveal it, the
"hidden" information is typically not visible when the document is
9 Perlman, supra note 7, at 772-75 (describing sources of increase).
0 Id.
" By way of anecdote, in the last case I helped try, we communicated
frequently with opposing counsel by e-mail. A dispute developed as to whether
opposing counsel were required to disclose the address of a potential witness to
us. One lawyer on our side wrote an e-mail to one lawyer on their side asking
them to do so. In response, we all received a reply, obviously intended only for
their side, in which one of their lawyers in response to our lawyer's request told
another of their lawyers to tell us "to go to hell." That e-mail became an exhibit
at a hearing on a motion to compel identification of that witness. When our lead
lawyer was pulling the e-mail out to use it, I heard one of their lawyers say to
another in a whisper, "here it comes."
12 For a thorough background as to why and how software like Microsoft
Word and Corel WordPerfect create and store embedded data, see David Hricik,
I Can Tell When You're Telling Lies: Ethics and Embedded Confidential
Information, 30 J. LEGAL PROF. 79 (2006).
" Another anecdote: while speaking about this topic to small-firm and solo
practitioners, one lawyer approached me during the break and explained that he
had received a proposed contract from the opposing party which contained
embedded data in the form of "comments" that revealed the other side's bottom
lines, and even descriptions of negotiating strategies and other tactics.
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printed or when the document is viewed in the creating word
processing program.14
Ultimately, not only are electronic documents more frequently
transmitted, they are more easily misdirected. In addition, they can
contain confidential information that is not visible either in the
printed document or in the document as typically viewed on the
computer screen. This Article addresses the ethical obligations of
lawyers who, outside the context of document production," receive
electronic files from opposing or third parties which contain
embedded confidential information. It addresses a question that
has split the bar: is it unethical to intentionally take steps to look
"behind" the document to see the embedded data?
14 See Hricik, supra note 12 (explaining the steps necessary to reveal
embedded data). While embedded data often can be viewed with the program
that created the particular file, specific steps must be taken to do so.
1s It is important to emphasize that this Article is limited to inadvertent receipt
outside the context of document production. Rules such as the new Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure may replace or augment the issues of ethics discussed
here if the issue is inadvertent production of documents during litigation. For
example, amended Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26(b)(5)(B) provides a
process for "clawing back" a privileged document produced during discovery:
If information is produced in discovery that is subject to a claim of
privilege or of protection as trial-preparation material, the party making
the claim may notify any party that received the information of the
claim and the basis for it. After being notified, a party must promptly
return, sequester, or destroy the specified information and any copies it
has and may not use or disclose the information until the claim is
resolved. A receiving party may promptly present the information to
the court under seal for a determination of the claim. If the receiving
party disclosed the information before being notified, it must take
reasonable steps to retrieve it. The producing party must preserve the
information until the claim is resolved.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5)(B).
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II. THE ETHICS OF INTENTIONALLY TAKING ADVANTAGE OF
OTHER PEOPLE'S FAILURES
"The first thing [some lawyers] often do when they get
documents[-i.e., electronic files-]from the opposition is to look
for metadata to see who drafted it or look for embedded versions of
earlier drafts."'" Most likely, the lawyer who looks for embedded
data is hoping that the lawyer who sent it either failed to remove
the information or failed in his attempt to do so. The bar
associations are split on whether trying to uncover this hidden
information is ethical. Some hold that taking active steps to view
embedded data violates two ethical rules, while others hold it
violates none.
Two issues arise in this context. First, is the inclusion of
embedded confidential data in an intentionally transmitted file
"inadvertent," requiring that the recipient notify the sender of the
mistake as if the embedded data was a misdirected fax? Second, is
it "dishonest" to take active steps to view embedded data?
A. Is Embedded Confidential Information Inadvertently Sent?
1. The Law ofInadvertent Transmission
It is important to survey the approach that courts and bar
associations take to the typical form of inadvertent transmission-a
misdirected fax or e-mail-in order to understand whether the
same law applies to the receipt of embedded data. This section
briefly describes that body of law.
The authorities have identified two forms of transmission that
implicate the ethical rules. One occurs when a lawyer
inadvertently includes an unintended person as a recipient of
correspondence." For example, this scenario occurs when counsel
16 Jason Krause, Guarding the Cyberfort, 39 ARK. LAw. 25, 31 (2004)
(bracketed material in original) (quoting Vincent Polley).
17 The ABA mentioned inadvertent transmission of e-mail when analyzing
waiver of privilege over a misdirected fax. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and
Prof'1 Responsibility, Formal Op. 92-368 (1992), withdrawn, ABA Comm. on
Ethics and Prof'1 Responsibility, Formal Op. 05-437 (2005) [hereinafter
Op. 92-368] ("[T]he availability of xerography and proliferation of facsimile
machines and electronic mail make it technologically ever more likely that
SPRING 2007]1 235
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sends a fax to opposing counsel that was intended for a client.'
The second form, which is actually an unauthorized transmission,
occurs when an unauthorized person intentionally transmits
privileged information to an opposing party." This latter form of
transmission happens when, for example, disgruntled employees
mail opposing counsel confidential documents that harm their
employer.20 Presumably, a file sent without authority will continue
to be viewed under the "unauthorized" rubric and not as an
instance of inadvertent transmission. Therefore, this Article
focuses on the more prototypical form of inadvertent transmission.
Even before the rise of e-mail, this form of inadvertent
transmission was so common that the American Bar Association
(ABA) issued a formal opinion in 1992 addressing the obligations
of lawyers who receive inadvertent transmissions. In ABA Formal
Opinion 92-368,21 the ABA concluded that lawyers who receive
facially confidential or privileged materials should refrain from
examining them, notify the sender, and follow the sender's
instructions. Moreover, many individual jurisdictions have
concluded that when a lawyer receives confidential information
and the circumstances clearly indicate that the transmission was
inadvertent, the recipient has an ethical duty to notify the
transmitting lawyer of the mistake and, in some jurisdictions,
follow the transmitter's instructions on how to proceed.22
through inadvertence, privileged or confidential materials will be produced to
opposing counsel by no more than the pushing of the wrong speed dial number
on a facsimile machine."); accord Fla. State Bar Ass'n. Comm. on Prof 1 Ethics,
Op. 93-3 (1994) [hereinafter Op. 93-3] ("Such an inadvertent disclosure might
occur as part of a document production, a misdirected facsimile or electronic
mail transmission, a 'switched envelope' mailing, or misunderstood distribution
list instructions.").
18 Op. 92-368, supra note 17; Op. 93-3, supra note 17.
19 See generally ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof 1 Responsibility, Formal
Op. 94-382 (1994) [hereinafter Op. 94-382], withdrawn, ABA Comm. on Ethics
and Prof 1 Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-440 (2006) (collecting cases).
20 See id.
21 See Op. 92-368, supra note 17.
22 See Perlman, supra note 7, at 783-85 (collecting authorities); see generally
Douglas R. Richmond, Key Issues in the Inadvertent Release and Receipt of
Confidential Information, 72 DEF. COUNS. J. 110 (2005); James Q. Walker,
236 [VOL. 8: 231
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Later, the ABA adopted a rule that specifically governs the
obligations of lawyers who receive information inadvertently sent
by another party. Model Rule 4.4(b) provides: "A lawyer who
receives a document relating to the representation of the lawyer's
client and knows or reasonably should know that the document
was inadvertently sent shall promptly notify the sender."23 A
comment to the rule explains that a lawyer who knows or
reasonably should know that a document was sent inadvertently
should "promptly notify the sender in order to permit that person to
take protective measures."2 4 The comments also specifically state
that the rule covers inadvertently sent e-mail.25
In some ways, Model Rule 4.4(b) is broader than Formal
Opinion 92-368; it covers all inadvertent transmissions, not just
those which involve confidential information. On the other hand,
the obligation imposed is narrower. In contrast to Formal Opinion
92-368, the only obligation imposed by Rule 4.4(b) is notice;
whether the lawyer should refrain from looking at the document
and whether the lawyer must abide by the sender's instructions are
matters not addressed by the Model Rules.26
Model Rule 4.4(b) has been adopted in roughly fifteen
jurisdictions.2 7 In addition, bar and judicial opinions in many
jurisdictions continue to impose more demanding duties upon
lawyers who receive inadvertently transmitted documents from
another lawyer than those imposed by Rule 4.4(b).2 8 The
Ethics and Electronic Media, 716 PRACTICING LAW INST., LITIG. 313, 334-36
(2004).
23 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) (2003) (emphasis added).24 Id. at cmt. 4.
25 id
26 id.
27 Perlman, supra note 7, at 783.
28 See id. at 783-84; see, e.g., N.Y. City Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof'1 & Jud.
Ethics, Op. 2003-04 (2004) [hereinafter Op. 2003-04] (concluding that a lawyer
who receives misdirected documents must, if it contains "confidences" or
"secrets," advise the sender of the mistake, unless the lawyer has a good faith
belief that a tribunal before which a dispute is pending will conclude
confidentiality has been waived); N.Y. County L. Ass'n Ethics Comm., Op. 730
(2002) (concluding that a lawyer should assist in preserving the confidences of a
sender of inadvertently privileged documents); Op. 92-368, supra note 17
SPRING 2007] 237
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requirements imposed upon lawyers by these bar opinions vary
significantly,29 however, and not every jurisdiction has adopted
either an opinion or Model Rule 4.4(b) to address this issue.3 0
Nonetheless, the authorities addressing the issue have imposed at
least an obligation of notice on lawyers who receive information
under circumstances where he or she knows, or should know, that
the information is confidential and was inadvertently sent.'
2. The Nature ofInadvertence
Because the ethical obligations of lawyers depend on the
presence of "inadvertence," it is important to be clear about what is
"inadvertent" and what is "advertent" in this context. This
traditionally clear dichotomy is challenged by electronic
communication. Consider the lawyer who creates a file and sends
it to the very lawyer to whom he meant to send it, but the file
contains embedded confidential information that the sending
lawyer did not know was going along with the file. Can the
transmission of the embedded data be characterized as inadvertent
when it is clear that the lawyer intended to transmit the file, but not
to send the embedded data? Thus, the inadvertence associated
with the embedded data is the converse of the fax situation: the
recipient is intended but the content is not.
In the typical Model Rule 4.4(b) scenario, the receiving lawyer
knows that the document was not intended for him, since it was
probably addressed to another person or the document revealed
strategies for litigation or settlement. It is not a great leap, under
those circumstances, to conclude that the recipient knew or should
have known that the information was inadvertently sent.
Can the same thing be said about embedded data? After all,
intentionally sending a file with the embedded data makes the
(concluding that the recipient of misdirected communication should advise
sender of the mistake and abide by its instructions).
29 See Op. 2003-04, supra note 28 (discussing variations and disagreements
on the duty).
30 Perlman, supra note 7, at 781-83. Some state bar associations reject Model
Rule 4.4(b). For example, in Md. Bar Ass'n Inc., Op. 2007-9 (2007), the
Maryland Bar Association held that there is no obligation concerning
misdirected documents because Maryland had not adopted Model Rule 4.4(b).
31 Perlman, supra note 7, at 783-85.
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transmission, to some extent, advertent. There was no mistake as
to which file to send.
An analogous situation would be when a lawyer mails one
document to opposing counsel, but unknowingly includes in the
envelope another document that contains confidential information.
No doubt, the lawyer intended to send one document. The courts
and bar associations have had no difficulty in concluding that this
does not mean that he intended to send both.32 Thus, the
unintentional inclusion of a confidential document is inadvertent
notwithstanding its association with a document that was sent
intentionally.
Arguably, the situation of embedded data may be different
because there is only one document involved; the lawyer intended
to transmit the file and that file contained the embedded data.
Even so, can the transmission of confidential data in the file
nonetheless be deemed to be inadvertent?
The authorities are split on the answer to this question.
3. Existing Authority on Embedded Information and Inadvertent
Transmission
The New York Bar Association was the first to address this
issue and took the position that inclusion of embedded confidential
information may be inadvertent, even if it is included in an
intentionally transmitted file." New York Opinion 749 established
a strong presumption of inadvertence, recognizing that, although
the transmitting party intended to transmit the "visible" document,
"absent 'an explicit direction to the contrary counsel plainly does
not intend the lawyer to receive the 'hidden' material or
information."3 4 Thus, the New York State Bar concluded that
lawyers who receive files with embedded data either know, or
should know, that the embedded data was not sent advertently.
32 See, e.g., Pa. Eth., Op. 99-150 (1999) (concluding that "ministerial
errors"-along the lines of putting the wrong document in an envelope with the
intended one-have been deemed "inadvertent").
33 N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof I Eth., Op. 749 (2001) [hereinafter
Op. 749].
34 d.
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More recently, an opinion from Florida confirmed this view."
It concluded that lawyers should "not try to obtain from metadata
information relating to the representation of the sender's client that
the recipient knows or should know is not intended for the
recipient. Any such metadata is to be considered by the receiving
lawyer as confidential information which the sending lawyer did
not intend to transmit."" Thus, the bar associations of Florida and
New York have both concluded that, even if the document was
transmitted intentionally, the embedded data was not.
These opinions seemed to make sense. However, in an August
2006 opinion," the ABA rejected the proposition that embedded
data is always unintentionally sent." Although the ABA seemed to
suggest that some embedded data could be deemed to be
inadvertently sent, its analysis on this critical point is less than
clear.39
The ABA first concluded that Model Rule 4.4(b) by its terms
does not apply and, instead, characterized the rule as merely the
"most closely applicable rule" because it "relates to a lawyer's
receipt of inadvertently sent information."4 0 Emphasizing its
disagreement with the proposition that embedded data is never
unintentionally sent, the ABA stated that, although Model
Rule 4.4(b) might require the lawyer to notify the sender of the
receipt of the information if it was sent inadvertently, "the Rules
do not contain any specific prohibition against a lawyer's
reviewing and using embedded information in electronic
documents." 4' Further, the Committee noted that it "does not
characterize the transmittal of metadata either as inadvertent or as
advertent, but observes that the subject may be fact specific."42
The Committee ultimately stated that whether a receiving lawyer
3s Prof'1 Ethics of the Fla. Bar, Op. 06-2 (2006).3 6 Id. (emphasis added).
37 Op. 06-442, supra note 5.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 d
41 Id.
42 Id. at n.7 (noting that no rule "addresses the duty of a recipient of
advertently transmitted information").
[VOL. 8: 231240
Mining For Embedded Data
knows or should know that embedded data was sent
"inadvertently" in terms of Model Rule 4.4(b) was a question
"outside the scope of this opinion." 43
4. Who got it right?
Embracing the proposition that embedded data is not always-
or at least not presumptively-included unintentionally is startling,
and it opens the door for lawyers to review embedded data first and
ask questions later. This is striking because it is hard to imagine a
scenario where a lawyer would intentionally include confidential
information in the form of embedded information. Thus, as two
other bar associations realized, a lawyer at least should know that
any embedded confidential information was sent inadvertently.
The ABA's determination that inadvertence of embedded data
transmission depends on the facts in which transmission arises
ignores reality and gives license to recipient lawyers to contend
that such information was included advertently. The ABA's
approach also cannot be harmonized with the opinion's own
characterization of embedded data as well-known. If the existence
of embedded data was well-known, the transmission of embedded
confidential information would have to be inadvertent because no
lawyer intentionally sends confidences to the opposition. Thus,
even on the ABA's own premises, the only reasonable conclusion
is the presumption that embedded data was sent inadvertently.
What is even more troubling about the ABA's opinion is its
failure to acknowledge that opening a document in a word
processing program generally will not reveal embedded data. It
takes intentional steps beyond the double-clicking required to view
a word processing file to view embedded data. As the New York
Opinion emphasized: "[I]t is a deliberate act by the receiving
lawyer, not carelessness on the part of the sending lawyer, that
would lead to the disclosure of client confidences and secrets.""
The ABA did not address the fact that only active steps by the
recipient result in true receipt of the embedded data.45 As a result,
43 id.
"Op. 749, supra note 33.
45 op. 06-442, supra note 5, (reasoning that "[e]ven if transmission of
'metadata' were to be regarded as inadvertent, Rule 4.4(b) is silent as to the
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the ABA permits lawyers to intentionally take advantage of other
people's failures.
B. Is it Dishonest to Review Embedded Data?
Model Rule 8.4(c) provides that it is "professional misconduct"
for a lawyer to "engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud,
deceit or misrepresentation." 46 Rule 8.4(c)'s "prohibition . . . is a
broad one. It encompasses conduct toward clients, tribunals,
parties, witnesses, opposing counsel, and everyone else, both
within and outside the realm of the practice of law. It covers the
act of failing to disclose, as well as affirmatively lying."4 7
This section analyzes whether it is dishonest, within the
meaning of Model Rule 8.4(c), to view embedded confidential
information. The authority, once again, splits on this question and
even on whether the answer matters.
ethical propriety of the use of such information"). In other words, Rule 4.4(b)
merely requires notification to the opposing party of its receipt, but does not
address what, if anything, the lawyer must do next. The conclusion is:
in jurisdictions with Rule 4.4(b) or its equivalent, a lawyer who receives
inadvertent transmissions must notify the other side, but how to proceed from
that point is a matter beyond the scope of the rules. Comment 3 to Model
Rule 4.4(b) states:
Some lawyers may choose to return a document unread, for example,
when the lawyer learns before receiving the document that it was
inadvertently sent to the wrong address. Where a lawyer is not
required by applicable law to do so, the decision to voluntarily return
such a document is a matter of professional judgment ordinarily
reserved to the lawyer.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) cmt. 3 (2003).
46 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4(c) (2003).
47 ABA ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 609 (5th ed.
2003) [hereinafter ABA ANNOTATED].
[OL. 8: 231242
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1. Does it Matter if it's Dishonest?
Model Rule 8.4(c) is often characterized as a "catch-all."48 In
other words, "[o]ften, the same behavior that violates
subsection (c) also violates . .. other ethics rules."4 9 The role of
these catch-all provisions, as well as the need to avoid reading
them too broadly, was succinctly explained by the American Law
Institute:
Modem lawyer codes contain one or more provisions (sometimes
referred to as "catch-all" provisions) stating general grounds for
discipline, such as engaging "in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud,
deceit or misrepresentation" (ABA Model Rules of Prof'1 Conduct,
Rule 8.4(c) (1983)) ... . Such provisions are written broadly both to
cover a wide array of offensive lawyer conduct and to prevent
attempted technical manipulation of a rule stated more narrowly. On
the other hand, the breadth of such provisions creates the risk that a
charge using only such language would fail to give fair warning of the
nature of the charges to a lawyer respondent and that subjective and
idiosyncratic considerations could influence a hearing panel or
reviewing court in resolving a charge based only on it.... Tribunals
accordingly should be circumspect in avoiding overbroad readings or
resorting to standards other than those fairly encompassed within an
applicable lawyer code.
No lawyer conduct that is made permissible or discretionary under an
applicable, specific lawyer-code provision constitutes a violation of a
more general provision so long as the lawyer complied with the specific
rule. . . .'o
Thus, although Rule 8.4(c) is intended to catch conduct that falls
outside the technical reading of the other rules, it should not be
interpreted in a manner that either results in a failure of notice or
punishes what another rule permits.
As noted below, other bar associations have applied this
catch-all to the question of whether it is dishonest to review
embedded data. However, the ABA reasoned that because Model
Rule 4.4(b) addresses inadvertent transmission, the issue of
dishonesty was irrelevant: "[T]he recent addition of Rule 4.4(b)
identifying the sole requirement of providing notice to the sender
48 See, e.g., In re Alcorn, 41 P.3d 600, 611 (Ariz. 2002) (referring to
Arizona's equivalent of Rule 8.4(c) as a "catch-all").
49 ABA ANNOTATED, supra note 47, at 609.
50 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) LAw GOVERNING LAWYERS § 5 cmt. c (2000).
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of the receipt of inadvertently sent information, [is] evidence of the
intention to set no other specific restrictions on the receiving
lawyer's conduct found in other Rules.""1 In support of its
conclusion that Model Rule 8.4(c) was no longer intended to play
its gap-filling role under these circumstances, the ABA pointed
only to the following reporter's explanation of why Model
Rule 4.4(b) was added to the Model Rules:
Numerous inquiries have been directed to ethics committees regarding
the proper course of conduct for a lawyer who receives a fax or other
document from opposing counsel that was not intended for the
receiving lawyer. ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility Formal Opinion 92-368 advised that the
receiving lawyer is obligated to refrain from examining the materials,
to notify the sending lawyer and to abide by that lawyer's instructions.
That opinion has been criticized, in part because there is no provision
of the Model Rules directly on point. The Commission decided that
this Rule should require only that the lawyer notify the sender when the
lawyer knows or reasonably should know that material was
inadvertently sent, thus permitting the sending lawyer to take whatever
steps might be necessary or available to protect the interests of the
sending lawyer's client.52
By relying on this unadopted reporter's note that fails to
mention Rule 8.4(c), the ABA's opinion ignores a key distinction
between the problem of embedded data and other instances of
inadvertent transmission. While the reporter's note does
emphasize that the lawyer's only obligation upon receiving
information inadvertently is to notify the recipient, it fails to
address whether it is dishonest for a lawyer to search for it in the
first place. Rather, the note merely states that his only obligation
under the Model Rules is to notify the sender if he finds it. Thus,
the ABA's conclusion that the dishonesty of the conduct is
irrelevant places more weight on the reporter's note than it can
support.
Moreover, the reporter's note does not necessarily make the
dishonesty of looking at the embedded data irrelevant, nor does
5' Op. 06-442, supra note 5.
52 Am. Bar Ass'n Center for Prof 1 Responsibility, Model Rule 4.4 Reporter's
Explanation of Changes, http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2k/e2k-rule44rem.html
[hereinafter Reporter's Explanation] (emphasis added) (last visited Mar. 29,
2007).
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any authority cited in the ABA's opinion require the conclusion
that Model Rule 8.4(c) is irrelevant. Reading Model Rule 8.4(c) to
prohibit examining embedded data does not conflict with Model
Rule 4.4(b), because nothing in Model Rule 4.4(b) necessarily
permits a lawyer to look at embedded data. Additionally,
Rule 4.4(b), as interpreted by the ABA, requires a lawyer who
knows embedded data has been sent inadvertently to notify the
transmitting lawyer, which suggests that looking may be unethical.
The question then becomes, is it dishonest to look?
2. Is It "Dishonest" to View Embedded Data?
Recall that, normally, embedded confidential information is
invisible; that is why it is accidentally included. Thus, for a
recipient to view embedded data, he typically must take active,
deliberate steps to reveal the information.
Not surprisingly, bar associations have concluded that taking
active steps to look at confidential information is dishonest. The
New York bar association recognized that it smacked of dishonesty
for a lawyer to "intentional[ly] use . . . computer technology to
surreptitiously obtain privileged or otherwise confidential
information from an opposing party.""
The ABA disagrees on this issue, as well. After finding the
issue of dishonesty irrelevant, the ABA reasoned that it was not
dishonest for a lawyer to take active steps to review embedded data
that had been inadvertently sent by another lawyer.54 Its
conclusory explanation states twice only that "the Committee does
not share" the view of other bar associations that intentionally
looking to see if a lawyer included client confidences was
dishonest."
Because of the factual premises of the ABA's argument, the
opinion's conclusion is untenable. The ABA opinion assumes that
it is well-known that files contain embedded data and that
embedded data comes in an understandable form." These
5 Op. 749, supra note 33.
54 Op. 06-442, supra note 5.
5 Id.
56id.
245SPRING 2007]1
N.C. J. L. & TECH.
assumptions" do not change the fact that sensitive embedded data
will be included in a transmitted document only when the lawyer
sending it makes a mistake, i.e., an inadvertent transmission. No
lawyer intentionally transmits confidential information to an
opponent. Indeed, the fact of common inadvertent transmission is
what led the ABA to adopt Model Rule 4.4(b) in the first place."
Yet, the ABA opinion reasoned that it is not dishonest for the
receiving lawyer to actively take steps to uncover confidential
information that-under the opinion's assumptions-almost by
definition had to be inadvertently included.
Finally, the assumptions that embedded data is well-known and
understood crumble in the face of continued reports of
inadvertently transmitted embedded data. The only study located
found that, rather than being well-known, in as late as 2004, only
43% of respondents were aware that embedded data even existed.59
Reflecting that fact, major law firms have posted "filed versions"
of complaints on the Internet which contained embedded data that
revealed prior revisions, comments, and other embedded data.60
Corporations, governments, individual lawyers, and others have
done the same.6 1 Patches offering fixes and warning about
embedded data were released only in late 2006,62 at virtually the
same time the ABA issued its opinion stating that everyone knew
5 In my opinion, the ABA's assumption is clearly wrong. I have lectured
about embedded data to several hundred lawyers in states from Rhode Island to
Florida to Texas to California. The vast majority had no clue what metadata
was before I began to speak.
Reporter's Explanation, supra note 52 (explaining that "numerous
inquiries" about misdirected documents had led to the adoption of Rule 4.4(b)).
5 Stephen Shankland, Hidden Text Shows SCO Prepped Lawsuit Against
BofA, NEWS.COM, Mar. 4, 2004, http://news.com.com/2102-7344_3-5170073.
html?tag=st.util.print.
60 id.
61 See Tom Mighell & Dennis Kennedy, Staying on Track with Track
Changes, ABANET.ORG, Mar. 2007, http://www.abanet.org/lpm/lpt/articles/
slcG307 1.shtml (last visited Apr. 11, 2007).
62 For example, Corel's patch-which fixed a bug in its earlier "metadata fix"
that allowed comments to remain with a document even after they had been
"removed"--was made available in July 2007. See WordPerfect Office X3
Service Pack 1 (July 26, 2006), http://www.corel.com/content/wpo/WPOSPl_
PatchReadme.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2007).
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and understood about embedded data. Given the realities, the
ABA's conclusion that embedded data is not sent inadvertently, or
is not presumed to have been sent inadvertently, is inexplicable.
The notion that a lawyer should be permitted to look for
inadvertently transmitted embedded data and, thereby,
intentionally take advantage of the accidental failure of a colleague
to understand the inner workings of software is startling. The
characterization of the intentional act of taking advantage of those
mistakes as anything less than dishonest is disappointing.
III. CONCLUSION
We have not heard the last word on this issue.
After lecturing about embedded data in front of hundreds of
lawyers across the country, my impression is that lawyers in large
law firms or more sophisticated law firms are aware of these
issues. However, in my experience, the bulk of lawyers-those in
small firms and those who practice alone-are almost uniformly
and completely unaware of the existence of embedded data. Thus,
in some measure, the ABA's opinion provides protection to
lawyers in large firms because it allows them to look for embedded
data that they both know are there and know should not be there.
In my view, until it is clear that lawyers beyond those in the
largest or most sophisticated firms know about embedded data, the
courts and bar associations should hold that the transmission of
embedded data is either per se or presumptively inadvertent
transmissions. Further, lawyers should be required to refrain from
looking for embedded data and to notify the other side when they
learn that it has been received. In other words, courts should not
let lawyers intentionally take advantage of other people's failures.
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